On Wednesday, August 7, 2024, the Constitutional Court of Thailand announced its verdict in the case against Thailand’s Move Forward Party. The verdict was in line with the prediction of this author and many others, which was to dissolve the Move Forward Party and bar its leaders from politics and political office for 10 years. The verdict dissolved Thailand’s largest parliamentary party and the party that received the most votes in last year’s general election, winning 151 seats in parliament with over 14 million votes. The verdict does not destabilize Thai politics or the overall status quo in the Kingdom from what it was before the verdict. However, the court’s verdict and the available reasoning provide some insight into potential implications for Thailand’s political economy. The case was brought before the Constitutional Court by the Electoral Commission on the grounds that the party’s 2023 political program to reform Article 112 of the Penal Code, the lèse majesté law, was an attempt to overthrow the democratic regime with the king as head of state.
Constitutional Court ruling Key features
The court ruling had several important thrusts at its core. First is the obvious: the Move Forward Party no longer exists, its leaders are barred from politics, and party leader Pita Limchareonlat, the kingdom’s most popular politician, is barred from politics for ten years.
Second, the court reaffirmed its primacy over party platforms and legislative processes. It ruled that the party platform of Article 112 reform posed a threat to state security because it did not clearly state that any changes would not affect Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution, which state that Thailand is an indivisible kingdom with a democratic regime and the King as head of state. In essence, the court set a clear precedent by ruling that there should be no talks, political stances or legal proceedings that in any way affect the royal institution. The ruling also made it clear that any change in the mechanisms or laws surrounding the royal institution posed a threat to state security. In addition, the court ruled that the political platform of Article 112 reform brought the monarchy and the royal institution into disrepute and disgraced politics that the royal institution should be above. Some commentators argue that the Court has not ruled out amending or reforming Article 112, but the Court’s vagueness about what constitutes a legal amendment to the law is interpreted by this author as an “invisible gate” that is off-limits. If a party attempts to reform the law in the future, it is unknown whether it will also face the dissolution of the law.
Third, by extending the above, the court interfered in the balance of power and relations between the executive and legislative branches of parliament. In effect, the ruling has delineated that the royal institution is off-limits to any legal or other consideration by any institution or person in the kingdom. This is further reinforced by the fact that the Constitutional Court Act 2018 protects the court from any criticism of its decisions. The law charges defamation against the court in line with the criminal, appellate and supreme courts, but goes further and provides for a prison sentence of up to two years for defamation, which is not the case for the other courts. This protects the court from any negative or critical public commentary on its decisions. Essentially, everyone is muzzled after a case and must either agree with the ruling or keep their thoughts out of the public eye.
Most recently, the court portrayed itself as the arbiter of truth and of Thailand’s civil society, academia and foreign relations. The court stated that its verdict “contrary to the opinion of academics, politicians and diplomats of all diplomatic ranks, is a matter of national context and any opinion must take into account diplomatic customs and protocols.” This wording was probably included intentionally as a negative verdict would be heavily covered and criticized by the media and Pita’s meeting with 18 ambassadors at the German embassy on August 2 took place prior to the verdict. By this reasoning, the court led Thai civil society, academia and foreign governments to conclude that “Thailand is special in its context compared to all other countries” and Thai politics is a sovereign sphere that must be free from foreign interference. This reasoning is consistent with the previous two points that describe the court as a supra-institutional court in the Kingdom’s constitutional order.
Impact of the judgment
While the court ruling dissolves the Move Forward Party, it will not stop the forces unleashed by its predecessor, the Future Forward Party, which was also dissolved by the same court after the 2019 general election. The party has been resurrected as the People’s Party, bringing with it all 143 MPs from the now-defunct Move Forward Party. The movement for progressive change will continue, the outcome of course unknown.
The ruling severely rejected calls for reforms to Thailand’s political, economic and social system. The court made it clear in its ruling that reforms within the system will under no circumstances be permitted outside the status quo ante. The status quo is the current constellation of a government led by the Puea Thai. Thaksin Shinawatra returned to Thailand without being charged and the Thai elite has deliberately ignored the political conflicts of the past 15 years.
There will be no progressive change in the Kingdom’s politics and social relations in the immediate or medium term. Any economic change depends on current ideas, which include debt-based consumer spending through the Puea Thai digital wallet system, the invitation to mass tourism through an “ASEAN visa”, the vagaries of “soft power” generation, and casino gambling as a source of state revenue, jobs and tourism. These populist and quick-win ideas do not address Thailand’s economic need for deep structural reforms and the productivity lost over the past decades.
Finally, an anecdotal but notable anecdote. It concerns the court ruling that, whether intentionally or not, is destroying the hope of Thailand’s young people. As a lecturer in a course for the last semester before graduation, the author asked a group of 38 students about their plans for the first one to three years after graduation. No fewer than nine said they wanted to study abroad (in the West), find a job and not return to Thailand. The reason was simple: they see no future for themselves in the Kingdom’s economy and society. The deeper reason was a sense of disconnection from the direction Thailand is heading, social frustration with censorship and a sense of deep injustice in Thai society as a whole. As an educator, this is heartbreaking and does not bode well for the Kingdom. Many of the country’s brightest and most capable minds no longer see the Kingdom as a place worth living and contributing to.
The reason for this unease is simple. The political system produces unfair outcomes that do not reflect the will of the people, the economy is stagnant and all attempts/demands for change fall on deaf ears. To make matters worse, calls for change are punished severely. Hundreds of people, including children, are currently in prison or in exile abroad. Activist “Bung” died in prison earlier this year. In this spirit, the fight for a better Thailand continues; we will see how it turns out.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
