Opinion | Vietnam’s To Lam ruthlessly consolidates control and re-shapes the party in his image

He acted with the same speed and determination that was already evident in December 2022, when he began systematically targeting his rivals in the Politburo. Over the next 20 months, he organized the resignation of seven of the 18 members elected at the 13th Party Congress in January 2021.

It was an unprecedented level of political unrest and personal ambition in a system that prides itself on its stability and collective leadership.

Even before his election, Lam nominally held the office and often represented Trong in his absence as the 80-year-old politician’s health deteriorated.

While the focus is on the resignations forced by Lam, attention must now turn to his consolidation of power, which was equally effective.

Lam was elected president in April after Presidents Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong were forced to resign.

He attempted to remain president and minister of public security simultaneously, but faced opposition from both the Central Committee and the National Assembly. While Lam’s opponents attempted to bring Tran Quoc To, the younger brother of former President Tran Dai Quang, to power, Lam succeeded in securing the rise of his own protégé.

Luong Tam Quang is not only his long-time deputy, but also has close family ties to Lam. The two men come from the same province, Hung Yen. During the Vietnam War, which the Vietnamese call the “American War,” Quang’s father served as Lam’s father’s personal bodyguard.

On August 16, Lam secured Quang’s promotion to the Politburo, a key ally in this 15-member elite body.

But Lam has placed allies – mostly former Ministry of Public Security officials – in other key positions.

He appointed another deputy minister, Nguyen Duy Ngoc, as head of the Central Committee office. The Central Committee appointed him as the party’s secretariat at a meeting in mid-August.

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Vietnam’s President Vo Van Thuong resigns after just one year

Vietnam’s President Vo Van Thuong resigns after just one year

At the same meeting, the Central Committee appointed two more people to the Secretariat: Lieutenant General Trinh Van Quyet, head of the General Political Department of the Army and a permanent member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission. The second is Le Minh Tri, chairman of the Civil Affairs Committee of the Central Committee and Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the government’s top prosecutor.

The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the party, and the influx of members coming from the security services reflects the regime’s fundamental insecurity about a “color revolution.”

The Politburo recently confirmed Police Major General Vu Hong Van, also from Hung Yen, as Vice Chairman of the Central Inspection Commission, serving as Tran Cam Tu’s deputy.

Although it is impossible to know the true nature of Lam’s relationship with Tu, it is suspected that there is bad blood between the two sides. Many saw the Central Inspection Commission, which is responsible for investigating senior politicians, as only one of two institutional checks on Lam as he used the Ministry of Public Security’s investigative resources to eliminate rivals in the Politburo.

Van is considered Lam’s eyes and ears in the Central Inspection Commission and is supposed to ensure that it does not turn against the Secretary-General or his allies.

If there were previous concerns that the Nghe An-Ha Tinh faction would dominate Vietnamese elite politics, these seem to have disappeared since Vuong Dinh Hue’s forced resignation in early April. Lam has ensured that his own Hung Yen faction is on the rise.

In addition to those mentioned above, the senior ranks of the Ministry of National Defense and the People’s Army are gradually being filled with individuals from Hung Yen, including Lieutenant General and Deputy Minister Hoang Xuan Chien and Lieutenant General Nguyen Hong Thai, the commander of Military Region 1, one of two along the border with China.

This is no coincidence, as the People’s Army is an alternative center of power to the Ministry of Public Security. It is a trusted political institution over which Lam has little influence, despite his new role as chairman of the Central Military Commission, the military’s highest leadership body.

While Lam is trying to win over some loyalists, the military and the Ministry of Public Security have long been institutional rivals. At the very least, Lam wants to ensure that the military does not challenge him at the 14th Congress in 2026. The People’s Army is the largest bloc in the Central Committee and currently accounts for around 13 percent of its members.

One exception to the Hung Yen faction is perhaps recent arrival Le Minh Hung, the former governor of the State Bank of Vietnam. Hung is from Ha Tinh but is closely related to Lam. Hung’s father was former Public Security Minister Le Minh Huong, who guided Lam’s career. Hung currently heads the Central Committee’s Organizing Commission, making him responsible for all the party’s personnel appointments ahead of the 14th Party Congress, making him an indispensable ally of the General Secretary.

Hung accompanied Lam to China along with Minister of Public Security Luong Tam Quang and a third Politburo member, Do Van Chien.

Lam is expected to continue to use the fight against corruption as a weapon against his rivals, to maintain the loyalty and line of his officials and to deter opponents of his rule.

There are still rumors that retired General Luong Cuong will take over as president, which would restore the traditional balance of power in the “Four Pillars” leadership structure. However, Lam seems quite comfortable in both positions. After his trip to China, he will travel to the United States in September to address the UN General Assembly.

If anyone can defy the norm of collective leadership, it is Lam. She is creating the conditions for an unprecedented concentration of power.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and security issues. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the National War College or the Department of Defense.