Many observers of Vietnam’s foreign policy wondered which country To Lam, the newly appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), would choose as the destination for his first foreign trip. This question now has an answer.
On August 15, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry confirmed that Lam and his wife will pay an official visit to China from August 18 to 20 at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. What expectations and messages does this visit convey for Vietnamese-Chinese relations?
First of all, it can be said that Vietnam-China relations have been at their best and most stable since the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1991, and especially since Xi Jinping came to power 13 years ago. Although there have been occasional problems in relations during this period, especially in the South China Sea, and the trade balance is still heavily in China’s favor, the two countries reached a common understanding during Xi’s visit to Vietnam last December and established a “China-Vietnamese community of shared future with strategic significance.”
It goes without saying that the stable relations between Vietnam and China are partly due to the personal relationship between Xi and the late General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Nguyen Phu Trong, who died suddenly on July 19. Relations between Xi and Trong are based on mutual understanding, respect and support for the overall development of both countries. But they are also based on many similarities between the two men.
Both Trong and Xi became leaders of their respective communist parties around the same time. Both focused on consolidating the Communist Party’s power as the sole ruling party and emphasized a version of Marxism-Leninism that suited the circumstances and development path of their respective countries. Both also launched hardline anti-corruption campaigns to purge the party and state apparatus. Many believe that Trong’s “red-hot furnace” anti-corruption campaign is a copy of the “tiger and fly swatter” that Xi carried out during his own anti-corruption campaign.
The parallels are limited, however, and Trong’s “red hot furnace” appears to have far exceeded Xi’s efforts, for it led to the resignation of two sitting presidents, a chairman of the National Assembly, two deputy prime ministers and a permanent member of the Secretariat. When Trong died, Xi went to the Vietnamese embassy in Beijing to mourn him, bowing three times before a portrait of the late Vietnamese leader.
Given his great contribution to the good relations between the two countries, there is speculation, including on the Chinese side, as to whether relations between Vietnam and China will enter a similar phase to that after Ho Chi Minh’s death in 1969. The post-Ho Chi Minh period saw a rift between the Vietnamese and Chinese communists, culminating in the Chinese invasion in February-March 1979 and lasting until 1989. This war caused material damage and loss of life and left indelible psychological scars on the Vietnamese people, creating a negative attitude towards China. It also left a very bad impression of the communist world as a whole, allowing clashes to break out between nations that viewed each other as “comrades and brothers” and whose closeness was compared to “lips and teeth”.
A day before Trong’s state funeral, a Chinese scholar wrote an article titled “Vietnam-China relations in the post-Nguyen Phu Trong era must not show any deviations” (冯超: “后阮富仲时代”的中越关系,不应出现任何偏航). There is no indication that the article was a warning from the Chinese leadership, but it is certainly a notable reminder. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership has also been testing Vietnam’s response. In separate incidents on August 2 and 5, a Chinese drone, identified as a Wing Loong-10 unmanned aerial vehicle, took off from China’s Hainan island and illegally entered Vietnam’s airspace and exclusive economic zone, flying about 800 kilometers along the coast before turning back near Phan Rang province.
Most observers believe that this is China’s response to the joint exercises between Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. However, this incursion can also be seen as a test of Vietnam’s China policy under the new CPV chief, as the second incursion took place two days after To Lam was elected to the post. It is noteworthy that the Chinese side deliberately switched on the aircraft’s tracking devices, which was not the case in previous cases. Vietnam has remained silent on the incident.
In this context, the fact that To Lam chose China as the destination for his first foreign trip just two weeks after his appointment as Party Chairman sends at least three messages beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of politicians from both countries: First, that Vietnam attaches importance to relations between the two parties and views them as a strategic orientation for the development of relations between the two countries.
Second, To Lam wants to reaffirm that he will continue the diplomatic legacy of his predecessor Xi Jinping at the highest level. This time, Lam is visiting China in the dual capacity of General Secretary and President, meaning he holds a position completely equal to Xi. This is the first time since the Ho Chi Minh era that a Vietnamese leader has visited China in both capacities.
Third, the visit conveys the message that Vietnam is consistently developing its relations with China and considers this a strategic choice and the top priority of its foreign policy. Any fears about deviations in Vietnamese-Chinese relations are therefore unfounded.
The visit of the CPV to China, which took place in the context of silence over the incursion of Chinese unmanned military aircraft, can be seen as a strategic silence in the overall framework of Vietnam’s strategic patience towards the South China Sea disputes. It is also a message about the consistent expectation of the visit, namely that Vietnam wants to maintain stable Vietnam-China relations and that both sides need to strengthen political trust through sincere actions rather than threats or intimidation.