Ten years ago, I spoke on a high-level panel during the UN General Assembly’s Ministerial Week to celebrate the accession of the first 50 States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty and its impending entry into force. It was an exciting day of grandiose speeches and declarations about the transformative impact of the ATT on the arms trade and the benefits it would bring to people around the world who would otherwise suffer from armed violence, protracted conflict, human rights abuses and displacement. How many of these goals have been achieved a decade later? For families bombed in Gaza or Kyiv, shot at in Juba or persecuted by armed gangs in Haiti, the answer may not seem like much.
At the recent ATT preparatory meeting for 10.th Conference of States Parties, the proceedings seemed unchanged since I last attended in 2019: an all-male panel discussing gender balance in delegations, grumbling about unpaid contributions, and colorful slides showing declining reporting trends. As with the meetings before, there was minimal discussion of actual arms transfers. At one point, when a Palestinian delegate referred to arms transfers being used against civilians in Gaza, the Chair reminded delegates to “stick to the agenda items.” Since the moment was an assessment of how well Article 6 (absolute prohibition on transfers used for war crimes) and Article 7 (risk assessment of weapons used in violations of IHRL and IHL) were being complied with, I could not think of a more relevant real-world issue.
In these conference rooms, the ATT seems anything but successful in a world marred by conflict and tragedy. The real momentum of the ATT unfolds outside these borders. Around the world, civil society groups are challenging their governments’ arms sales to conflict zones and human rights abusers, using legal means under the ATT. From Canada to Brazil to the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and Denmark, court cases are underway as activists use the ATT to legally challenge decisions on arms sales. This is essentially what the ATT has made possible. This possibility marks a decisive shift: governments can no longer justify arms sales with the morally reprehensible argument that “someone else will do it.”
One of the most glaring tests of the ATT came soon after it came into force. Since March 2015, the actions of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen have displaced millions of people and triggered famine, underscoring the human cost of arms exports. Despite repeated appeals and evidence from civil society at ATT meetings, formal responses often bypassed real-world discussions of arms exports and focused instead on financial contributions and procedural mechanisms. Activists intensified their efforts at home, leading to legal battles in countries such as the UK, where court decisions have faltered in the face of escalating humanitarian crises. At the same time, arms industry profits have soared, underscoring the urgent need for strong accountability in arms export decisions.
It is impossible to meaningfully discuss the impact of current arms controls without mentioning Israel’s war on Gaza. The daily images of relentless bombing of homes, hospitals and schools and the sheer suffering and destruction of entire families have raised public awareness worldwide. It is not only civil society that is rising to these challenges. The government of Nicaragua has filed a case with the ICJ to stop Germany’s military support for Israel. Nicaragua is not a state party to the ATT and was actually critical of the treaty during negotiations. But it is interesting to see a state invoking international law to try to stop arms shipments, and perhaps it is an indication of the effect the ATT has had on embedding an understanding of the link between arms shipments and atrocities. In the Netherlands, work by Oxfam, PAX and The Rights Forum against the Dutch government halted the export of parts for F-35 fighter jets, and following public pressure, Canada, Spain and Italy have withdrawn new export licenses. In the UK, France, Denmark and other ATT parties, public pressure continues to grow over their decisions on arms transfers.
The campaign for the ATT ran at full speed for ten years between the launch of the Control Arms campaign in 2003 and the adoption of the treaty in 2013. The work began even earlier, when Nobel laureates and academics studied how the success of the then-recent anti-personnel mine ban treaty could be applied to the conventional arms trade. The campaign gave this work international prestige, reduced the goals to a global treaty and condensed the message to “No arms for atrocities”. Three states – Mali, Costa Rica and Cambodia – thought this was a good enough idea to support it publicly. Almost everyone else said it was crazy, idealistic and impossible to implement. This strengthened our campaign resolve. By 2005, over 50 states had endorsed the call, and when the UK led a group of 7 “co-authors” in drafting and submitting the first UN resolution for an Arms Trade Treaty, the campaign helped mobilise 154 governments to vote yes. Over the next seven long years of formal UN process, preparatory committees, open working groups, groups of government experts and a multitude of international side events, regional workshops and campaign conferences, the treaty was adopted.
Campaigning for a treaty requires high expectations and persistence. But securing a treaty is only the beginning; maintaining momentum after passage proves difficult. Initial enthusiasm fades and funding becomes scarce as larger organizations and governments shift their focus. Larger organizations move on to other campaign issues, as do governments. Funding becomes much, much more difficult.
Official meetings are often subject to bureaucratic tendencies to create the necessary framework and financing mechanisms, albeit with administrative challenges. Discussions on the ATT have often been dominated by financing contributions, highlighting differences between richer and poorer states in meeting financial obligations. While there have been threats of reprisals for defaulting contractors, penalties for actual breaches have remained minimal. Participation in Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) often has a procedural character.
As for whether the ATT is working, its true impact is seen in legal battles, parliamentary scrutiny and media criticism that bring to light the arms deals that fuel atrocities. The ATT provides a legal framework that is crucial to restricting arms transfers to places where they are likely to be used in violation of international law. However, its implementation lacks the necessary force without robust enforcement mechanisms and clear reporting standards. Activists and others bringing legal cases are a sign of success in this context.
Of course, some of the successes of the past decade can also be found in the bureaucratic labyrinth. The creation of national control lists, the provision of funding for implementation projects, and the production of national reports by States on their arms transfer activities are all important. It is these less exciting but crucial aspects that can contribute most to the important work of preventing diversion. One aspect that all States agreed on was the need to stop the illegal arms trade. And since 99% of arms deals start in the legal trade, it is essential to get it under control. The huge grey area between legal and illegal trade is a problem that States Parties can use the ATT to address.
The ATT will not do this on its own. No law or treaty can. Stigma and norm-building are crucial, but efforts are needed to sustain them. The energy outside the formal process, which was particularly evident in the bombing of Palestine, is not waning. This does not mean abandoning the CSP process. States parties and observers should revive these meetings, have the political courage to tackle the difficult issues, and be prepared to challenge other states, including allies, when the treaty is violated. In particular, they should:
- Talk about rejecting transfers. The ATT is designed to stop arms shipments that fuel atrocities. To see success, States Parties must provide examples of where they have actually refused a shipment. Specific details are helpful, but where this overwhelms diplomatic stomachs, general statements would be a start, such as: “This year we have refused exports of small arms, fighter jet components and bombs valued at x due to the outsized risk of violations of international humanitarian law.”
- Secure your obligations financially. The global arms trade is worth over $100 billion. Can’t we raise even 1% of that to fund efforts to properly regulate it?
- Support civil society. The ATT was born out of the dedicated efforts of civil society around the world, who lobbied doggedly for it. For a treaty to work, governments need a critical, accountable voice, combined with the technical skills and long-standing experience that many NGOs bring. Civil society needs money to participate effectively.
- Adhere to contractual obligations: Compliance with the treaty is essential. Stop the sale of weapons where it is sufficiently clear that they will be used for war crimes. Take risk assessment seriously and refuse supplies where there is a clear risk of violating international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and make these measures public.
As for the CSPs, the challenge is to reinvigorate these forums to promote genuine dialogue and concrete action for a safer and more responsible global arms trade regime. States Parties have the power to make these forums work. Will they rise to the challenge?
