Was his role in Wagner’s major defeat in Mali an own goal?

As Ukraine’s foreign minister concludes his recent trip to Africa, his country risks paying a heavy diplomatic price for helping separatist rebels in northern Mali inflict a heavy defeat on Russian military operator Wagner late last month.

In the ambush at Tinzaouten on July 27, 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers were reportedly killed.

It was a painful military blow for the mercenary force once led by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, but now controlled by the official Russian defense command structure.

Just two days later, Andriy Yusov, spokesman for the Kyiv Military Intelligence Service (GUR), said that ethnic Tuareg rebels in Mali had received “necessary information, and not only information, that enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals.”

Later reports suggested that Ukrainian special forces had trained the separatists in the use of attack drones.

For many Africans, however, this was just another case of foreign powers using the continent as a bloody arena for their own rivalries.

As was to be expected, Mali’s ruling military junta and its allied regime in neighboring Niger protested by breaking off diplomatic relations with Kyiv.

But even more significant was a statement by the regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Despite its own diplomatic problems with the military regimes in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the community’s criticism was clear and unambiguous.

The alliance said it “strongly disapproves and condemns any external interference in the region that could pose a threat to peace and security in West Africa, as well as any attempt to draw the region into the current geopolitical disputes.”

The anger may have been fuelled by suspicions that some jihadist fighters had joined Tuareg separatists in carrying out the attack on Tinzaouaten.

The Senegalese Foreign Ministry summoned the Ukrainian ambassador in Dakar in protest after he posted a video on Facebook about Mr Yusov’s malicious comments.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited Malawi, Zambia and Mauritius last week, but after the harsh statements by Ecowas and Senegal, he may now have to make serious efforts to resolve the conflicts in West Africa.

Many sub-Saharan governments – even those that secretly distrust Moscow – are likely to view Kyiv’s unhelpful military adventurism from the outside as a sign of its unwillingness to help. This could destroy the goodwill painstakingly built up over the past two years through peaceful Ukrainian diplomacy.

Of course, from a military point of view, it was a success for the Ukrainians to help inflict on Wagner the heaviest defeat in Africa in history.

The mercenary group – now officially renamed Corps Africa after coming under Russian state control – had doubled its troop strength in Mali to an estimated 2,000 men over the past two years.

Therefore, the news of the heavy losses in Tinzaouaten came as a shock, especially given that the Malian army and Wagner’s troops had captured Kidal, the “capital” of the Tuareg rebels, last November.

The incident in Tinzaouaten was a sign that the separatists were going on the offensive again – and, as it soon turned out, with the support of a new partner.

Kyiv’s hints of direct involvement confirm how far the country is prepared to extend its fight against Russian President Vladimir Putin far beyond the domestic battlefield.

In fact, this is not the first such direct intervention against Wagner’s military operations in Africa.

There was strong evidence that Ukrainian special forces carried out drone strikes in Sudan last August and September in support of the military regime of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

For more than a year it is involved in a brutal power struggle with its former allies, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the leadership of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti”, who was supported by Wagner.

Some Ukrainian military commentators, such as Evgeniy Dikiy, former commander of the Ukrainian Aidar Battalion, portray their country’s reported military interventions in Africa following the invasion of Russian forces in February 2022 as a struggle for survival.

Mr Dikiy argued that although Kyiv does not pursue an African policy, it still has a score to settle with Russia and especially with Wagner.

But the government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may not see things quite so simply.

Because we know that the fight against Moscow is not only being fought on the battlefield. Diplomacy and trade are also important.

And immediately after the 2022 invasion, Kyiv was painfully reminded of this truth, especially with regard to Africa.

At the UN General Assembly on March 2 of the same year, only 28 of the 54 African member states voted to condemn the invasion.

While only a few of Moscow’s close allies actually voted for Russia’s actions, many other African governments actively abstained or stayed away from the vote, including some that are generally considered to be staunchly pro-Western.

And when President Putin later withdrew from the agreement that allowed both Ukraine and Russia to safely transit grain exports – many of them destined for Africa – across the Black Sea, many sub-Saharan governments preferred to view the setback neutrally rather than blame Moscow.

Although this specific issue has lost importance because Ukraine has largely regained its freedom to transport grain following the attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Kyiv Foreign Ministry team remains convinced of the need to rebuild political and economic networks across Africa.

Kuleba has now made four trips to Africa, and while his campaign to win goodwill and build partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa has not always gone smoothly – hopes of being received by President Cyril Ramaphosa during a visit to South Africa late last year were dashed – there have also been important successes.

Zambia, for example, took part in the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland in June and, unlike some other participants, signed the final communiqué (with whose terms Kyiv was satisfied).

And last week, Mr Kuleba visited the Zambian capital Lusaka, where he was received by President Hakainde Hichilema.

By now reaching out to African countries, Ukraine is trying to regain the diplomatic ground it lost in the first three decades after its independence, when it was primarily concerned with its internal affairs.

While Russia inherited the global diplomatic presence of the old Soviet Union, newly independent states like Ukraine had to rebuild their networks from scratch.

Due to limited resources, over the course of 30 years, Kyiv managed to open only eight embassies on the entire African continent – ​​in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.

But after being reminded in such an unpleasant way in 2022 of the importance of winning friends and influencing people, Kyiv is now pushing to rapidly expand its reach. The goal is to build a network of 20 embassies in Africa, with the first 10 additional missions already announced.

In April, Kyiv’s special envoy for the Middle East and Africa, Maksym Soubkh, was in Abidjan to open the embassy in Côte d’Ivoire.

And Kyiv is proposing more than just diplomatic cooperation.

Eight sub-Saharan countries have already benefited from the “Grain from Ukraine” food aid initiative.

In addition, the country plans to expand its development aid, strengthen mutual trade and provide more study places for African students.

Controversial military adventures against Russian mercenaries appear to be an ill-advised risk that could jeopardise all the diplomatic goodwill and economic returns that Ukraine hopes to gain from its broad-based positive sub-Saharan Africa strategy.

Paul Melly is a consultant to the Africa Programme at Chatham House in London.